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Abstract
This paper explores how the Shapley value can be used as the basis of a payment rule
for auctions and exchanges. The standard Shapley value is modified so that losing
bidders do not make or receive any payments. The new rule, called the balanced win-
ner contribution (BWC) rule, satisfies a variation of Myerson’s balanced contribution
property. The payment rule is fair in the sense that, with respect to reported values,
the members of every pair of traders make equal contributions to each other’s share of
the gains from trade. BWC payments can be used in single-item auctions and more
complex auctions and exchanges with multiple items and package bidding. A series
of examples is presented to illustrate how the BWC rule works and how the payments
compare to those based on competitive prices, the core, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism.
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1. Introduction
This paper explores how the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) can be used as the
basis of a payment rule for auctions and exchanges. Deciding what payment rule to
use is a fundamental market design question in allocation problems with money. First
price (pay-as-bid) rules are simple to implement. Participants, however, must bid stra-
tegically (rather than bidding their true values), to receive a share of the gains from
trade. In an exchange setting, pay-as-bid typically generates a revenue surplus. Second
price, Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG), rules have attractive incentive properties, but in
auction settings can generate low revenues and in exchange settings typically result in
a revenue deficit. Payment rules based on competitive prices or surplus divisions in the
core result in balanced budgets in exchanges. However, for some allocation problems,
payments satisfying the rules do not exist, while for other problems they exist but are
not unique. Shapley value divisions of surplus always exist, are unique, and are budget
balanced. However, the Shapley value in its standard form, unlike the other mecha-
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nisms considered above, can allocate surplus to losing bidders, making it, at least at
first sight, appear unsuitable for use as a payment rule for auctions and exchanges.
The paper considers how the Shapley value can be modified to only allocate surplus
to bidders with winning bids while still allowing the competition from losing bidders to
influence the division of surplus. The surplus shares are average marginal contributions
over permutations of the bidders where the losing bidders appear before the winning
bidders. This results in losing bidders receiving zero surplus but influencing the di-
vision of surplus by defining outside options for winning bidders. The prices satisfy
a balanced winner contribution (BWC) property. When a single item is being sold,
the prices produced by the mechanism can be thought of as intermediate between those
that would be produced by a first price and a second price auction. When multiple units
or multiple types of good are being traded, the pricing rule can be used in combination
with package bidding.
Several examples are discussed, some involve selling a single item and others mul-
tiple items. In multiple item cases, when traders have preferences over combinations
of items and items are traded individually, the exposure problem can occur. It arises
when getting to the desired allocation requires a sequence of trades that if started and
not completed, leaves the trader with a loss. A good example to illustrate this is flight
tickets. Flights can be substitutes. A traveler may want to fly between two cities but be
flexible about the departure time or where layovers occur. Flights can also be comple-
ments. A traveler may want an outward flight only if a return flight is also available.
A family may want four seats on a particular flight or none at all. Similarly, an airline
may want to sell tickets only if the quantity sold generates sufficient revenue to cover
the costs that could be avoided by canceling the flight. Using all-or-nothing package
bids and XOR constraints which allow at most one of a set of bids to be winning can
protect traders from the exposure problem. This is because traders can submit bids that
guarantee they will not end up holding unintended combinations of goods. In these
settings, BWC payments always exist, even in cases where there are no competitive
prices and the core is empty.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature.
Section 3 describes the environment studied and the notation used in the paper. The me-
chanism uses a procedure that has two stages. First, winning bids are determined (and
hence the allocation of commodities), then the division of surplus is calculated (and
hence the payments for winning bids). Section 4 describes how the winner determina-
tion problem is solved. Section 5 describes how solutions of the winner determination
problem for different sets of bidders can be used to construct a coalition game. Section
6 describes how, given the winning bids, prices are chosen to determine the division
of the surplus. The pricing rule is a variation of Myerson’s (1977; 1980) balanced
contribution property. Section 9 discusses the computational complexity of calculating
BWC payments and outlines a strategy for calculating approximations within a fixed
time constraint. Section 10 concludes. Proofs are in an appendix.
2. Related Literature
A number of studies have suggested using the Shapley value as a cost allocation
rule. For instance, Littlechild and Owen (1973) consider how to share the cost of pro-
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viding an airport runway when catering for larger aircraft costs more than catering for
smaller ones. They suggest the Shapley value as a solution. Roth and Verrecchia (1979)
consider how to allocate costs between departments within an organization. They show
how, under certain assumptions, using the Shapley value cost allocations will be equi-
valent to the expected outcome when managers bargain amongst themselves. The BWC
approach taken in this paper differs from approaches using the standard Shapley value
in that traders are partitioned into two sets, those with winning bids and those without,
and the value is calculated in such a way that those without winning bids make no pay-
ments. This partitioning of the bidders into two sets and then using these to calculate
a modified Shapley value is similar to the approach used to calculate the Owen value
(Owen, 1977). A key difference is that Owen considers ‘a priori unions’ where the
unions might have been formed by signing some agreement or represent membership
of a certain clan or family. Such unions may be independent of members’ contributions
to payoffs. In contrast, partitioning based on winning bids is based on contributions to
payoffs, since only those with winning bids contribute to the realized gains from trade.
The BWC rule can be used in auctions and exchanges that allow package bidding,
which protects traders from the exposure problem. Previous studies have identified a
number of settings where simple market mechanisms without package bidding may
perform poorly. In auctions, bidders face an exposure problem if the items beings sold
are complements but are sold individually. Bidders risk winning some but not all of
the items they bid on and ending up paying more than the items are worth to them.
Notable examples include auctions for airport landing slots (Rassenti et al., 1982) and
radio spectrum licenses (Bykowsky et al., 2000). Goeree and Lindsay (2012) find
that a related exposure problem can occur in exchanges when traders view items as
substitutes and traders are already endowed with an item they value. Another setting
where exposure can occur is when sellers have avoidable fixed costs. In such settings,
competitive prices may not exist and the core may also be empty (see Telser (1996) for
an analysis of the conditions under which the core can be empty).
One consequence of the exposure problem is that institutions that mitigate the pro-
blem may emerge. For instance, Sjostrom (1989) argues that in ocean shipping, a
potential empty core problem is mitigated by shipping conferences. The conferences,
which set prices and quantity quotas for members, first appeared in the late ninetieth
century and remained prevalent throughout the twentieth century.
Another consequence is that researchers and practitioners have actively designed
market mechanisms to alleviate the problem (see Milgrom (2007) for an overview
of package bidding, Bichler and Goeree (2017) for many of the important papers on
spectrum auction design, and Milgrom (2017) for a broad analysis of designing aucti-
ons with complex constraints). Package bidding solves the exposure problem by letting
bidders submit all or nothing package bids. Most research has focused on the auction
case with one seller and several buyers. Here, competitive prices may not exist but the
core is always non-empty (since there is a single seller who is required for a coalition
to get a positive payoff). One approach is to select payments in the core. Day and Mil-
grom (2007) analyze the properties of core selecting auctions. Since core payments are
typically not unique, some rule is needed to choose between them. Day and Cramton
(2012) present a procedure that can, for instance, select core payments that are closest
to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments.
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There has been less research on package exchanges. Parkes et al. (2001) introduce
and test a number of pricing rules that select payments as close as possible to the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments subject to the constraint that the exchange is budget
balanced and participating is individually rational. They find that a threshold rule works
best. Agents with a winning bid pay min(b, πvcg + x) where b is the amount bid, πvcg is
the VCG payment, and x is the threshold. Hoffman and Menon (2010) suggest using the
nucleolus as a payment rule for a package exchange. Schmeidler (1969) introduced the
nucleolus as a way to divide the surplus in a coalition game which is unique and always
exists. Maschler et al. (1979) explored its relation to other concepts. When the core
exists, it contains the nucleolus and when the core is empty, the nucleolus minimizes the
amount coalitions can gain by leaving the grand coalition. Fine et al. (2017) describe
a mechanism called ACE that was used since 1995 to trade emissions permits. It is a
package exchange that uses approximate competitive equilibrium prices. That is, the
per unit price for winning bids is as close as possible to uniform subject to budget
balance and participating being individually rational. These three approaches, like the
BWC rule, achieve budget balance but at the expense of strategy proofness.1 The
three approaches above approximate VCG payments, core payments, and competitive
prices respectively. The approximations are necessary to achieve budget balance and
make participation individually rational. In contrast, BWC payments do not require an
approximation to satisfy these properties.
3. Environment and Notation
Let N = {1, . . . , n} represent the set of n ≥ 2 traders. In an auction, the seller is
counted as a trader. Subsets of N will sometimes be denoted S and T with s and t
denoting their respective sizes. Traders have quasi-linear utility. Let M = {1, . . . ,m}
represent the set of m ≥ 1 commodities being traded. There may be multiple units of
each commodity but each unit is indivisible.
Bids are submitted simultaneously. The mechanism is detail-free in the sense that
it does not require any information about the distribution of traders’ types. The mecha-
nism treats bids as sincere reports of value.2 A bid is a pair ⟨b; q⟩ where b ∈ R is the
amount bid and q ∈ Zm is a vector specifying the quantity of each commodity supplied
or demanded. Positive quantities indicate giving money or commodities and negative
ones indicate taking. Traders may submit multiple bids but at most one bid per trader
can be winning (XOR bidding). Trader i’s bids are indexed Bi = {1, 2, . . . , |Bi|}. The
amount trader i ∈ N offers to pay in the bid with index k ∈ Bi is denoted bik and the
quantity of commodity j ∈ M for the same bid is denoted qik j.
An example illustrates the notation. Consider a market with two goods. An offer
to sell a package consisting of one unit of each good for 15 would be ⟨−15; 1, 1⟩. To
1A recent survey of the trade-offs between strategy proofness and other desirable properties can be found
in Lubin and Parkes (2012) and some recent developments of rules involving such trade-offs can be found in
Erdil and Klemperer (2010) and Lubin (2015).
2A series of examples are included in sections 7 and 8. Nash equilibria where traders do not bid sincerely
are considered.
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buy either a unit of good 1 or good 2 for 10 but not both, two bids would be submitted:
⟨10;−1, 0⟩ and ⟨10; 0,−1⟩.
4. Winner Determination
Agents may submit multiple bids. Let wik indicate whether agent i’s kth bid is
winning. The winner determination problem, for any subset of bidders S ⊆ N, is as
follows.
wd(S , M, B) = arg max
w
∑
i∈S
∑
k∈Bi
bikwik
subject to
∑
i∈S
∑
k∈Bi
qik jwik ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ M∑
k∈Bi
wik ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ S
wik ∈ {0, 1} ∀k ∈ Bi, ∀i ∈ S
(1)
The objective is to maximize the value of winning bids. The first constraint is that
for each commodity, the quantity demanded cannot exceed the quantity supplied. The
second constraint is that bids cannot be partially winning. This ensures that if an agent
submits a bid to buy two units and no other bids, if the bid is winning, the agent receives
exactly two units. The third constraint prevents more than one bid from the same trader
being winning. This allows bidders to express a preference to have at most one of a
number of items.
It is worth noting that the solution to the winner determination problem, the set
of winning bids that gives the maximum possible surplus, will not always be unique.
For instance, if a seller submits the bid ⟨0; 1⟩ and two buyers each submit ⟨10;−1⟩,
then a surplus of 10 can be obtained with the bid of either one of the buyers. The
mechanism described in this paper only requires that a single solution is found; in the
case of multiple solutions, one will be chosen arbitrarily.3
5. Auction Coalition Game
An auction or exchange and the submitted bids can be described as a coalition
game.
Definition 1. A coalition game (N, v) consists of a finite set of players N and a charac-
teristic function v : 2N 7→ R that satisfies v(∅) = 0.
Definition 2. An auction coalition game is a coalition game whose characteristic
function gives the surplus generated by the solution of the winner determination pro-
blem for different sets of traders.
3Software for solving integer linear programming problems (such as the winner determination problem)
is commonly designed to find a single solution, not all solutions. Hence, only requiring a single solution to
be found makes the mechanism easier to implement.
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Suppose M and B are fixed and let wS∗ denote a solution to equation 1 for bidders
in S . We can now write a characteristic function for the auction as follows.
v(S ) =
∑
i∈S
∑
k∈Bi
bikwS ∗ik (2)
The auction coalition game is monotone and superadditive.
Definition 3. A game (N, v) is monotone if for all S ,T ⊆ N, if S ⊆ T , then v(S ) ≤ v(T ).
Adding a bidder never reduces the surplus because the surplus obtained without
the new bidder is still feasible (it can be obtained by holding the set of winning bids
constant when the bidder is added).
Definition 4. A game (N, v) is superadditive if for all S ,T ⊆ N, if S ∩ T = ∅, then
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S ) + v(T ).
When auctions with two distinct sets of bidders are combined, the union of the sets
of winning bids in the un-combined auctions is feasible. This means that the surplus
in the combined auction will be at least the sum of the surpluses in the un-combined
auctions.
6. BWC Surplus Division
The auction coalition game describes the gains from trade that different coaliti-
ons can realize but does not specify how the gains are divided between players. The
division of surplus can be described using a value function.
Definition 5. A value is a function φ(v,T ) that for all coalition games (N, v) and T ⊆ N
gives a unique payoff vector in Rn such that
∑
i∈T φi(v,T ) = v(T ).
The value specifies the surplus share for each bidder but does not specify how this
surplus is derived in terms of an allocation of commodities and money. Bidders trade
the quantities specified in their winning bids.
qi =
∑
k∈Bi
wN∗ik qik (3)
The amount the bidder pays depends on the rule used to divide the surplus. Suppose
surplus shares are given by value ψ. Bidders will pay the amount they bid for any
winning bids less their share of the surplus.
πi =
∑
k∈Bi
wN∗ik bik − ψi(N, v) (4)
The standard Shapley value using our notation is:
ψ†i (T, v) =
∑
S⊆T\{i}
s! (t − s − 1)!
t!
[
v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S )
]
(5)
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The standard Shapley value does not use any information about which bidders have
winning bids. As a consequence, it can assign a share of the surplus to bidders who
have no winning bids. I propose the following modification that takes into account the
status of bids. For a given solution to wd(N, M, B), let NW denote the set of bidders
with a winning bid and NL = N \ NW denote those with no winning bids. A modified
value is then defined using T ⊆ NW instead of T ⊆ N.
Definition 6. The balanced winner contribution (BWC) surplus shares are
ψi(T, v) =
∑
S⊆T\{i}
s! (t − s − 1)!
t!
[
v (NL ∪ S ∪ {i}) − v (NL ∪ S )
]
(6)
One way to view BWC surplus shares is as a coalition game among all bidders,
but where the Shapley value is modified by only considering orderings of the bidders
where losing bidders appear before winning bidders.
The BWC surplus shares can also be described using a coalition game among the
winners.
Definition 7. The winner coalition game for auction coalition game (N, v) and solution
to the winner determination problem is (NW , v′) where NW is the set of traders with
winning bids and v′(S ) = v(S ∪ NL) with S ⊆ NW .
Using this definition, the BWC surplus shares are simply the standard Shapley value
of the winner coalition game.
The key components of the BWC mechanism have now been presented. For a given
set of bidders N, range of commodities M and bids B, the allocation and payments are
calculated as follows. First, the winner determination problem (Equation 1) is solved,
which gives the set of winning bids. Then the surplus shares are calculated using
Equation 6. Finally, payments are calculated as specified by Equation 4.
Table 1 shows the outcome of these three steps for a variation of the simple market
game example used by Roth (1988, p. 3). A seller values an item at 10; buyer L values
it at 22; and buyer H who values it at 26.4 The efficient outcome is for the seller to sell
the item to buyer H realizing the gain of 16. Applying the Shapley value to the game
(N, v) results in the following division of surplus: the seller gets 10, buyer L gets 2,
and buyer H gets 4. The problem with this division of surplus is that buyer L gets a
share of the surplus despite not being involved in any trades. An alternative would be
to completely exclude buyer L from the calculation by using the game ({1, 3}, v), which
results in an equal division of surplus between the seller and buyer H. The problem
with this division is that the competition between the buyers is not taken into account.
At the implied price of 18, both buyer L and H would be willing to buy the item. Using
the BWC rule, in contrast, gives a price of 24. At this price, contributions are balanced
in the sense that buyer H gets a surplus of 2 relative to not trading and the seller gets a
4The problem can be described as a coalition game (N, v) with players N = {1, 2, 3}. The gains from
trade that different coalitions can realize is given by v with v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(2, 3) = 0, v(1, 2) = 12,
and v(1, 3) = v(1, 2, 3) = 16. An alternative formulation is to define v as the value of outcomes rather than
realized gains. This does not change the allocation of surplus.
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Table 1: Example of winner determination, surplus division and payments
Agent Bids Surplus Payment
(1) Seller (v=10) ⟨−10; 1⟩ 14 -24
(2) Buyer L(v=22) ⟨22;−1⟩
(3) Buyer H(v=26) ⟨26;−1⟩ 2 24
Note: Winning bids are underlined.
surplus of 2 relative to trading with the other buyer at 22. Notice that in this example
24 is the midpoint of the range of competitive prices [22, 26].
The remainder of this section establishes and discusses some of the properties of
the BWC mechanism. Proofs of the propositions are in an appendix.
Proposition 1 (BB). The BWC mechanism is budget balanced.
If a mechanism runs a deficit, some party needs to be found to provide a subsidy.
Conversely, if it runs a surplus that is extracted by a non-participant, participants have
an incentive not to take part and instead divide the gains from trade amongst themsel-
ves. A budget balanced mechanism avoids these problems.
Proposition 2 (IR). The BWC mechanism is ex post individually rational.
This means that if participants do not bid more for items than they value the items
(or the converse in selling), then participants will not end up worse off than if they had
not taken part in the mechanism. Hence, participants do not face an exposure problem.
The problem can occur when getting to a desired allocation requires a number of trades
and if some but not all are executed, traders end up worse off than had they not traded
at all.
The two properties above are common to the BWC rule and the standard Shapley
value.
Proposition 3 (No loser payments). The BWC mechanism satisfies no payments for
losing bidders.
This property could be seen as advantageous based on an appeal to fairness. One
could argue that traders who do not contribute to the gains from trade should not receive
a share of the surplus from trade. The standard Shapley value does not satisfy this pro-
perty. In order to satisfy it, the BWC rule treats the winners and losers differently when
calculating surplus shares. This violates Shapley’s Symmetry axiom which implies that
a player’s surplus share depends only on the player’s effect through the characteristic
function.
While the BWC payment rule does not satisfy Shapley’s axioms, it does satisfy a
variation of Myerson’s (1977; 1980) balanced contribution property. Myerson showed
that the standard Shapley value satisfies a balanced contribution property and it is the
only value to do so. This relationship was further developed by Hart and Mas-Colell
(1989) who showed that for every coalition game, there is a unique potential function
and the marginal contributions of the players to the potential coincide with the Shapley
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value. This, in turn, allows the Shapley value to be derived from a single axiom. In this
paper, the contribution property is modified by restricting it to bidders with winning
bids instead of including all players in the game.
Definition 8. A value ψ satisfies the balanced winner contribution property if for every
auction coalition game (N, v) with winners NW ,
ψi(NW , v) − ψi (NW \ { j}, v) = ψ j(NW , v) − ψ j (NW \ {i}, v) (7)
for all i ∈ NW and j ∈ NW .
Proposition 4 (BWC). The BWC rule satisfies the balanced winner contribution pro-
perty.
Proposition 5 (Uniqueness). The BWC rule is the only payment rule that satisfies the
balanced winner contribution property.
Satisfying the balanced winner contribution property could be seen as a reason to
use the BWC payment rule over possible alternatives. It could be justified using an ar-
gument similar to the one Myerson (1980) makes in favor of the balanced contribution
property. Namely, it is an equal-gains principle with respect to reported values. For
any two traders A and B with winning bids, A’s gain from trade due to B is equal to B’s
gain due to A. This is arguably a fair way to divide the surplus.
7. Comparing BWC with the Core and Competitive Equilibrium
BWC payments, competitive prices, and core payments all satisfy no payments for
losing bidders and budget balance. There are some settings where the core and compe-
titive prices are guaranteed to exist. For example, in the assignment game analyzed by
Shapley and Shubik (1971). The example shown in Table 1 is a simple instance of such
an assignment game. In this particular example, the BWC payments coincide with the
mid-point of the core.
Shapley (1971) established several results for convex games, notably that every
convex game has a non-empty core and for such games, the Shapley value is in the
core. These results can be used to identify settings where BWC payments coincide
with core payments.
Definition 9. A game (N, v) is convex if for all S ,T ⊆ N, v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S ) + v(T ) −
v(S ∩ T ).
Proposition 6 (Convex games). If the winner coalition game is convex, then the core
of the auction coalition game is non-empty and contains the BWC payments.
This provides sufficient conditions for the core and BWC payments to coincide.
It is also interesting to consider cases where BWC payments do not coincide with
competitive prices or core payments. BWC payments always exist and are unique for a
given profile of winning bids. In contrast, competitive prices and core payments do not
always exist, and when they do exist are not necessarily unique. Hence, as a market
design tool, an advantage of BCW payments is that they can be used in settings where
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Table 2: Competitive prices and the core
Agent Bids Surplus Payment
Two demand types and no competitive equilibrium
Airline ⟨0; 1, 1⟩, ⟨0; 1, 0⟩, ⟨0; 0, 1⟩ 75 -75
Tourist ⟨90;−1,−1⟩ 15 75
Co-authors ⟨60;−1, 0⟩, ⟨60; 0,−1⟩
Larger market with two demand types
Airline 1 ⟨0; 1, 1⟩, ⟨0; 1, 0⟩, ⟨0; 0, 1⟩ 86 −86
Airline 2 ⟨0; 1, 1⟩, ⟨0; 1, 0⟩, ⟨0; 0, 1⟩ 86 −86
Tourist 1 ⟨90;−1,−1⟩ 6 84
Tourist 2 ⟨90;−1,−1⟩
Co-authors 1 ⟨60;−1, 0⟩, ⟨60; 0,−1⟩ 16 44
Co-authors 2 ⟨60;−1, 0⟩, ⟨60; 0,−1⟩ 16 44
Avoidable fixed costs and empty core
Small Airline ⟨−85; 1⟩, ⟨−85; 2⟩ 15 -100
Large Airline ⟨−150; 1⟩, ⟨−150; 2⟩, ⟨−150; 3⟩
Traveler 1 ⟨55;−1⟩
Traveler 2 ⟨60;−1⟩ 12.5 47.5
Traveler 3 ⟨70;−1⟩ 17.5 52.5
Note: Winning bids are underlined.
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competitive prices and core payments cannot. Three examples are presented in Table
2.
The top panel of the table shows a variation of an example used by Baldwin and
Klemperer (2016) to illustrate demand types. An airline is offering two flights for a
particular weekend: one from London to Paris and one from Paris to London. A tou-
rist would like to visit Paris for the weekend and so views the flights as complements
and is offering 90 for both as a package. A pair of co-authors, one based in London
and one in Paris would like to work together in the same city the following week, and
so views the flights as substitutes and are offering to pay 60 for either flight (but not
both). It is readily verified that it is efficient for the tourist to buy both flights but there
are no competitive prices that support this outcome. Solving the winner determination
problem selects this outcome and the BWC rule gives a price of 75 for the two-flight
bundle. It is easy to verify that despite the absence of competitive prices, this is a core
outcome since the airline cannot achieve a surplus of 75 or more by forming a coali-
tion with the co-authors. The profile of bids shown is not a Nash equilibrium. Both
the airline and the tourist can increase their payoffs by adjusting their bids. There is,
however, a Nash equilibrium that produces the payoffs shown in the table. Suppose the
tourist bids 75, the airline bids -75 for each bundle, and the co-authors’ bids are un-
changed. This gives the payoffs shown in the table and no player can gain by changing
their bids.5
The middle panel of Table 2 illustrates what can happen as the market gets larger.
The example has agents with the same demand types as the top panel but there are two
copies of each type. The efficient allocation is for a return-flight bundle to be allocated
to one of the tourists and one flight to be allocated to each of the pairs of co-authors.
Interestingly, unlike the first example, this allocation can be supported by competitive
prices. When both types of flight are priced at 45, the tourists are indifferent between
buying and not buying the bundle, and each of the pairs of co-authors wants to buy
one flight but is indifferent about which type. The competitive prices would give zero
surplus to tourist 1 and a positive surplus to each of the pairs of co-authors and the
airlines. The BWC surplus shares differ from this, with tourist 1 receiving a positive
surplus. The reason for this is that there are some orderings of the set of winners
where tourist 1 makes a positive marginal contribution (e.g. tourist 2, airline 1, airline
2, tourist 1). The profile of bids is not a Nash equilibrium. The efficient allocation
of flights can be supported by a Nash equilibrium where all agents place bids at the
competitive prices, but this gives a different profile of payoffs.
The example in the bottom panel of Table 2 differs from the two above in that
it concerns a market with an empty core. The example is used by Telser (1994) to
illustrate how avoidable fixed costs can lead to an empty core. A small airline has a
plane with capacity 2 and the cost of a flight is 85. A larger airline has a plane with
capacity 3 and the cost of a flight is 150. For both airlines, the cost of a flight does not
depend on the number of passengers. There are three travelers who are willing to pay
55, 60, and 70 respectively for a seat on a flight. The efficient outcome is for the small
5In this equilibrium, each bidder can be thought of as having a profit target. Such equilibria in first price
menu auctions are studied by Bernheim and Whinston (1986), who called them ‘Truthful Nash Equilibria’.
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airline to fly with travelers 2 and 3. However, not only are the no competitive prices that
support this outcome, there is also no profile of payments that cannot be blocked by
some coalition, that is, the core is empty. Consequently, a payment rule for this market
cannot be based on competitive prices or core payments. The BWC surplus shares and
payments are shown in the table. The two travelers with winning bids pay different
amounts with traveler 3 paying more but also enjoying a higher surplus. Again, the
profile of bids is not a Nash equilibrium but there is a Nash equilibrium that supports
the efficient allocation.6
8. Comparing BWC with VCG
Both VCG payments and BWC payments always exist and are unique for a gi-
ven profile of winning bids.7 Both mechanisms feature no loser payments. VCG is
incentive compatible but is not budget balanced. Conversely, BWC is not incentive
compatible but is budget balanced.
To aid comparison with the BWC mechanism, surplus shares in the VCG mecha-
nism can be expressed in terms of the auction coalition game as follows.
Proposition 7 (VCG surplus). In the VCG mechanism, bidder i’s surplus is φVCGi (N, v) =
v(N) − v(N \ {i}).
Both the BWC and VCG surplus shares can be described in terms of marginal
contributions. The difference between them is due to the weights given to different
orderings. The BWC surplus shares take the average marginal contributions over all
orderings where the winners, NW , appear after the losers, NL. The same set of orderings
is used to calculate the surplus shares of all players, which results in a balanced budget.
The VCG surplus shares are calculated using different orderings for each player. As can
be seen above, rather than the average marginal contribution across a set of orderings,
just the ordering where the player in question appears last is used.
An exchange implementing VCG payments will typically run a budget deficit and
so require a subsidy from the auctioneer. In auction settings, the seller often also plays
the role of the auctioneer, in which case the revenue is not the surplus calculated using
Proposition 7. Instead, it is the sum of the buyer payments and the seller effectively
absorbs any deficit. Consequently, auctions implementing VCG payments for buyers
with the seller acting as auctioneer risk low seller revenues.
Ausubel and Milgrom (2006) suggest one of the reasons the VCG mechanism is
rarely used in practice is the potential low seller revenue. The top panel of Table 3
shows a variation of an example they use to illustrate this point, and compares the
6Suppose the small airline bids -120 for both bundles, the large airline bids -300 for each bundle, traveler
1 bids 1, and travelers 2 and 3 bid 60. No player can individually increase their payoff by changing their
bids. However, a coalition of traveler 1 and the large airline can jointly adjust their bids and increase their
payoffs.
7When there are multiple solutions to the winner determination problem, there are multiple ways to
allocate items that maximize reported surplus. Each of these allocations will be associated with a different
profile of winning bids and payments. This is the case for the BWC and VCG mechanisms as well as the
pay-as-bid mechanism.
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Table 3: Low VCG revenue
Agent Bids VCG payment BWC payment
Low VCG revenue with 3 buyers
Airline ⟨0; 1⟩, ⟨0; 2⟩ −4 −2 2/3
Couple ⟨2;−2⟩
Single traveler 1 ⟨2;−1⟩ 0 1 1/3
Single traveler 2 ⟨2;−1⟩ 0 1 1/3
Higher VCG revenue with 2 buyers
Airline ⟨0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 2⟩ −2 −2
Couple ⟨2,−2⟩
Single traveler ⟨2,−1⟩ 2 2
Note: Winning bids are underlined.
VCG and BWC payments. An airline is offering two seats on a flight. A couple desires
a package of two seats. Two single travelers each desire a single seat. All are offering
to pay 2. Despite the competition for seats, the VCG revenue is zero. In contrast, the
BWC revenue with sincere bidding is 2 2/3. Notice that even if the two single travelers
reduce their bids to 1 (the lowest they can bid and remain winning), the revenue is still
2 compared to zero under the VCG mechanism.
Ausubel and Milgrom show how in the VCG mechanism the seller revenue can
decrease when a bidder is added. They argue that this non-monotonicity creates loop-
holes and vulnerabilities that bidders can sometimes exploit by colluding or using shills
(multiple identities). The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the effect of removing a bid-
der, illustrating the non-monotonicity. The VCG revenue increases from zero to 2. In
contrast, the BWC revenue, with sincere bidding, falls from 2 2/3 to 2.8
9. Computational Complexity
If a market mechanism is going to be used in practice, it is necessary to consider not
just its economic properties but also whether the computations involved in determining
allocations and payments are tractable. Solving the winner determination problem for
a combinatorial market is NP-hard.9 This suggests that for markets above a certain
8Without sincere bidding, there are Nash equilibria such that the revenue remains at 2 when the number
of bidders is reduced. When there are 3 buyers, the two single travelers need to bid such that the sum of their
bids just exceeds the bid of the couple. When there are 2 buyers, the remaining single traveler and the couple
both bid 2. One of the bids is selected at random to be the winner. There is no incentive to adjust bids.
9In computational complexity theory, NP-hard problems are those that are at least as hard as the hardest
problems in the class NP. The hardest problems in NP are classed as NP-complete. A number of important
combinatorial problems are NP-complete and there are no known algorithms that can solve them in polyno-
mial time. It is readily verified that the combinatorial market winner determination is NP-hard since it can be
used to solve some well-known NP-complete problems. For instance, the knapsack problem can be modeled
as an auction with a seller offering to sell any quantity of a good up to some capacity and buyers bidding
different amounts for different sized packages. The set packing problem can be modeled as an auction with
13
size, it may not be feasible to solve the winner determination problem. The problem
applies whatever pricing rule is used, but may be more acute for BWC pricing. If a
pay-as-bid rule is used, the winner determination problem needs to be solved once. For
VCG payments, it needs to be solved nw + 1 times where nw is the number of bidders
with winning bids. For BWC payments, it needs to be solved 2nw − 1 times.
In computationally challenging cases, one option would be to calculate payments
that approximate the BWC payments.10 This could be done by employing two strate-
gies. First, instead of solving the winner determination problem for the global optimal,
use a procedure that returns the best solution found so far after a certain amount of
time has expired. Solving the winner determination problem is an integer linear pro-
gramming problem. Currently available software for solving such problems typically
uses a branch and bound algorithm, which allows the best solution found so far to be
retrieved. Second, instead of basing payments on all nw! orderings of the winners, base
payments on a sample of the orderings. This could reduce the number of times the win-
ner determination problem needs to be solved. Note that when global optimal solutions
to the winner determination problem are used to calculate marginal contributions, mar-
ginal contributions are always non-negative. But when best-so-far solutions are used,
this is not necessarily true. Accordingly, some adjustments may be required to ensure
surplus shares are always non-negative and their sum is the total available surplus.
Algorithm 1 illustrates how the two strategies could be used. On line 1, the subrou-
tine wd(N, t¯) is called which begins solving the winner determination problem with the
set of bidders N and time limit t¯. If the time limit is reached before a global opti-
mal solution is found, the best-so-far solution is returned.11 On line 2, the subroutine
permutations(NW , n¯) is called. It returns a set of permutations of the set of winners
NW . If n¯ is less than the number of permutations of NW , a random sample of n¯ unique
permutations is returned; otherwise, all permutations are returned. Line 3 initializes
surplus shares to zero. Lines 4 to 15 iterate over permutations and bidders within each
permutation. On line 9, the winner determination subroutine is called with a subset of
bidders and time limit t¯. The returned surplus is used to calculate marginal contributi-
ons. In cases where a best-so-far solution is returned, the solution may not be globally
optimal. As a result, it is possible adding a bidder will decrease the surplus. Line 10
ensures that, in such cases, marginal contributions are non-negative, which is needed
for ex post individual rationality. Line 11 ensures the sum of marginal contributions for
an ordering does not exceed vNW , which is needed for budget balance. Assuming only
solving the winner determination problem takes a non-negligible amount of time, the
algorithm provides a way to determine the winning bids and calculate surplus shares
a seller offering one unit of each of a number of different goods and buyers bidding to buy different com-
binations. The subset sum problem can be modeled as a market for a single good with traders submitting
package bids to buy or sell different quantities (solving the winner determination problem gives a subset of
orders whose quantities sum to zero).
10Another option is to avoid computationally challenging cases by placing restrictions on the packages
agents can bid on. Rothkopf et al. (1998) analyze how such restrictions can be used to make determining
winning bids in combinatorial auctions manageable and Goeree and Holt (2010) test this approach experi-
mentally.
11Assume that results are stored so that if the routine has previously been called for a given set of bidders,
the previous result is returned immediately.
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Algorithm 1: Find winning bids and approximate BWC surplus shares
Input: Bidders with bids N, time limit t¯, permutations limit n¯
Output: Winners NW , winning bids wN∗, BWC surplus shares ψ
1 ⟨NW ,wN∗, vNW ⟩ ← wd(N, t¯) ;
2 P ← permutations(NW , n¯);
3 foreach bidder i in N do ψi ← 0 ;
4 foreach permutation p in P do
5 vlast ← 0;
6 S ← N \ NW ;
7 foreach bidder i in p do
8 S ← S ∪ {i};
9 v ← wd(S , t¯);
10 if v < vlast then v ← vlast;
11 if v > vNW then v ← vNW ;
12 ψi ← ψi + (v − vlast)/|P|;
13 vlast ← v;
14 end
15 end
16 return ⟨NW ,wN∗,ψ⟩
within a specified time-limit even for computationally challenging cases.
A numeric simulation was run to measure how closely the outcomes of the algo-
rithm approximate the true BWC outcomes. An environment was chosen where cal-
culating the true BWC outcomes took a moderate amount of time. This meant there
were gains to be had from using the algorithm but calculating the true BWC outcomes
was not prohibitively time consuming, so the approximate outcomes generated by the
algorithm could be compared to the true ones. The environment had a single seller with
24 items and 5 buyers. Each buyer bid for every possible package of 5 items (hence
each buyer placed 42,504 bids). The amounts buyers bid were drawn from the expo-
nential distribution with parameter λ = 1. The seller bid zero. Running the auction
always results in the seller and four buyers having winning bids and one buyer having
no winning bids. This is because each of the 5 buyers wants exactly 5 items but only 24
items are offered. Accordingly, the true BWC surplus shares are calculated based on
the 120 permutations of the 5 winners. A total of 1,000 auctions were simulated. For
each auction, outcomes were calculated with different constraints on the time allowed
for the winner determination problem and on the number of permutations evaluated.12
Fig. 1 shows results of the simulation. Panel (a) shows how long it takes to solve the
winner determination problem. Determining the winning bids involves solving a linear
integer programming problem. The branch and bound procedure used to solve the
problem produces a sequence of best-so-far candidate solutions and terminates when
12The simulations were run on a desktop PC with an Intel i5-6500 3.20GHz CPU and 16GB RAM. The
winner determination problem was solved using Gurobi Optimizer version 7.5.1.
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Fig. 1: The results shown are based on 1,000 auctions with 1 seller, 5 buyers and 24 item, with each buyer
bidding for every package of 5 items. Panel (a) shows how time constraints on the winner determination
problem affect the percentage of the available surplus realized when either only verified global optimal
solutions are counted (the solid line) or best-so-far ones are used (the dashed line). Panels (b), (c) and
(d) show how surplus shares are affected by constraints on the time allowed for winner determination and
on the number of permutations of the winners evaluated. ‘Relative approximation error’ is the normalized
Euclidean distance between the approximate and true BWC surplus shares.
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it has been proved that there is no solution better than the current best candidate. The
solid line labeled ‘verified best’ shows the percentage of the 1,000 auctions where the
winner determination procedure had terminated at different times. All the auctions
had the same number of bids, bidders and items but the time taken for the procedure
to terminate varied considerably. Suppose the procedure is run with a time constraint
and trades are only implemented if it has terminated before the time limit. The solid
line can be interpreted as the average percentage of the available surplus that would be
realized in this case. Now suppose that on reaching the time limit before the procedure
has terminated, the best-so-far solution is implemented instead of no trade. The dashed
line shows the average percentage of the available surplus that would be realized in
this case. When best-so-far solutions are used, considerably less time is needed to
realize surplus. Half the surplus is realized after 1.3 seconds and 100 percent after 24.9
seconds compared to half after 11.1 seconds and 100 percent after 514.8 seconds when
only verified-best solutions are used. These results show there is indeed scope to limit
the worst-case time spent on the winner determination problem while still preserving
most of the surplus.
Panel (b) shows how imposing a time constraint on the winner determination pro-
blem affects individual surplus shares as opposed to overall surplus. Approximate
BWC surplus shares were calculated with constraints on the time for the winner de-
termination problem. Then the relative approximation error was calculated as the Eu-
clidean distance between the approximate and true BWC surplus shares normalized by
the Euclidean distance between the true shares and zero. Notice that the approximation
error falls to zero after 24.9 seconds which is the worst-case time to find the maximum
surplus labeled on Panel (a).
Panel (c) shows how imposing a constraint on the number of permutations evaluated
affects the surplus shares. Note that the true BWC surplus shares are the average margi-
nal contribution over all permutations of the winners. Hence, if a simple random sam-
ple of permutations is drawn and used to calculate approximate BWC surplus shares,
the expected value of the approximate shares is the true shares. Furthermore, if the
sample is drawn without replacement, the approximate shares equal the true shares
when the number of draws is equal to the number of permutations.
Panel (d) is a heat map showing how different combinations of time constraints
and permutation constraints affect the approximate BWC surplus shares. The lighter
shades indicate smaller approximation errors. The contour lines show different com-
binations of constraints that on average result in the same approximation error (they
are analogous to iso-quants for a production function). The area in the top right above
the ‘0’ contour represents combinations where the error is zero. Notice the relation to
the points the approximation error reaches zero in panels (b) and (c). At the ‘0’ con-
tour, the constraints become binding and tightening them increases the approximation
error. If, for example, a 0.05 error level is tolerable, there is considerable scope to
tighten the constraints beyond the points where they are binding. This, in turn, allows
computationally challenging cases to be made more tractable.
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10. Discussion
A remarkable feature of the Shapley value is that for every coalition game it gives
a unique profile of payoffs. Payoffs satisfying other solution concepts such as the core
and competitive equilibrium do not always exist, and when they do exist, they are
not necessarily unique. This paper has shown how the standard Shapley value can be
modified so that it can be used to determine payments in auctions and exchanges such
that losing bidders do not make or receive any payments. The resultant BWC payment
rule is budget balanced and ex post individually rational. It is also the unique payment
rule that satisfies the balanced-winner-contribution property. This is arguably a fair
way to divide the surplus.
A number of examples were used to illustrate how BWC payments work in practice
and how the payments compare to those based on other rules. For some simple cases,
BWC payments coincide with core payments and payments based on competitive pri-
ces. In other cases, the payments do not coincide. The BWC payment rule can produce
payments in cases where competitive prices do not exist and where the core is empty.
The BWC mechanism shares some properties with the VCG mechanism. Both always
produce unique payments for a given profile of winning bids. The mechanisms dif-
fer in that VCG is incentive compatible but not budget balanced whereas BWC is not
incentive compatible but is budget balanced.
There are several directions future research could explore. One would be exploring
the incentive properties of BWC payments. This could be done analytically for sim-
ple cases or by using computer simulations for more complex ones. Another would
be developing refinements to the BWC payments rule. These could involve realizing
additional market design objectives or protecting against potential vulnerabilities to
gaming. Finally, the BWC mechanism could be tested in the laboratory.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 (BB). Budget balance implies that the sum of the surplus shares
equals the available surplus, v(N). The BWC surplus shares are based on the |NW |!
orderings of the winners NW . The marginal contributions are calculated after the losing
bids have been added, v (NL ∪ S ∪ {i}) − v (NL ∪ S ). Note that v(NL) = 0. Hence the
marginal contributions of any ordering of the winners also sum to v(N). The BWC
surplus shares are the mean marginal contributions across all orderings. It follows that∑
i∈NW ψi(NW , v) = v(N). This implies budget balance.
Proof of Proposition 2 (IR). Suppose that there is some bidder who pays more than he
or she bid. The payment rule defined by equation 4 shows that it must be because
ψi(NW , v) < 0. Since ψi is a weighted average of marginal contributions, at least one of
the marginal contributions must be negative, that is v (NL ∪ S ∪ {i}) < v (NL ∪ S ). But
this is a contradiction. Adding a bidder cannot decrease the surplus from the winner
determination problem since the solution without the new bidder is still feasible.
Proof of Proposition 3 (No loser payments). The proposition follows immediately from
the definition of BWC payments (see equation 4).
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The next two propositions (4 and 5) are variations of theorems from Myerson
(1977) and Myerson (1980). Using Definition 7, the auction coalition game (N, v)
and the solution to the winner determination problem can be used to write a win-
ner coalition game (NW , v′) where NW is the set of traders with winning bids and
v′(S ) = v(S ∪ NL) with S ⊆ NW . The standard Shapley value of the winner coali-
tion game is equivalent to the BWC surplus shares of the auction coalition game.
Proof of Proposition 4 (BWC). The proposition follows from Lemmas 1 and 2 from
Myerson (1980) applied to the winner coalition game.
Proof of Proposition 5 (Uniqueness). The proposition follows from Lemmas 3 and 4
from Myerson (1980) applied to the winner coalition game.
Proof of Proposition 6 (Convex games). From Shapley (1971) Theorem 4 and Theo-
rem 7 it follows that if the winner coalition game is convex, then the game has a non-
empty core which contains the BWC surplus shares. This is because the standard
Shapley value of the winner coalition game is equivalent to the BWC surplus shares. If
a coalition C can block a profile of payoffs in the auction coalition game, the coalition
C ∩ NW can block the associated profile in the winner coalition game. Hence, if a pro-
file of payoffs is in the core of the winner coalition game, then there is an associated
profile of payoffs in the core of the auction coalition game. It follows that if the winner
coalition game is convex, then the BWC surplus shares are in the core of the auction
coalition game.
Proof of Proposition 7 (VCG surplus). Let wN∗ represent the solution to the winner de-
termination problem when i’s bids are included and wN\{i}∗ when he or she is excluded.
Bidder i’s VCG payment
πi =
∑
j∈N\{i}
∑
k∈B j b jk
[
wN\{i}∗jk − wN∗jk
]
. Bidder i’s surplus gain is
φVCGi (N, v) =
∑
k∈Bi bikw
N∗
ik − πi. Substituting the expression for πi and using (2) gi-
ves φVCGi (N, v) = v(N) − v(N \ {i}).
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